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IS GOOD to have this opportunity to discuss
with you some of my views on the outlook for the
United States economy in the near future. It happens
that we presently stand in one of those rare situations
in which there is a wide divergence of forecasts with
regard to almost all areas of economic interest. More-
over, economic issues, for various reasons, have be-
come more newsworthy and of greater interest to the
average citizen in recent times.
Let me first summarize briefly the current economic
situation and then address myself to four broad
questions:
1) When will inflation end?
2) Will there be a recession?
3) Will there be a credit crunch?
4) What is the outlook for the international mone-
tary situation?
I must tell you now that I will advance neither
specific numerical forecasts nor quick and easy solu-
tions to our existing economic problems. The adoption
of specific and usually optimistic targets, and the
employment of quick, politically expedient solutions
in an attempt to achieve them, have, in my opinion,
contributed much to our current economic difficulties.
Current Cond.itions
The present time is relatively prosperous, and
therefore should be an enjoyable one for most people
— not only with regard to economic well being, but
in other important respects. The unemployment rate
is lower than it has been in several years, corporate
profits after taxes are almost double their 1970 low
point, per capita disposable personal income has
never been greater, and even lost output due to labor
strikes was at a nine-year low in the first half of 1973.
Also, this country’s participation in the bitterly divi-
sive Vietnam conflict has ended, no more young peo-
ple are being drafted, and social unrest has declined
significantly.
However, a number of factors suggest we are not
enjoying our prosperity to the degree one might ex-
pect. The stock market, often taken to reflect the
public’s mood, has been depressed throughout most
of 1973. A new measure of welfare has been advo-
cated by Professor Paul Samuelson which is obtained,
in part, by eliminating ostensibly undesirable goods,
such as pollution and military expenditures, from
total output. This index has been growing progres-
sively slower relative to gross national product in
recent years, indicating our happiness has not kept
pace with our GNP.
The index of consumer sentiment, which is com-
piled on the basis of answers to questions such as
“will you be better off financially a year from nosy”
and “will the country have good times or bad over
the next five years,” was about as low in the second
quarter of 1973 as in the depths of the 1970 recession,
and lower than at any point in the period from 1957
to 1969.
Now, I have no great confidence in any of these
kinds of indexes, singly or even en masse, because
attitudes and welfare are so difficult to measure. But
Id ohappen to agree that there currently exist serious
economic and noneconomic problenis which are con-
tributing to a widespread feeling of malaise, or gen-
eral unhappiness.
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Much of this atmosphere can be traced to the
failure of policymakers to inform the public of the
hard choices which must be made in a world where
resources are limited and desires are not. It is my
belief that by fostering the impression that there are
no problems which cannot be cured by government
action, policymakers have unnecessarily elevated the
public’s expectations and then dashed their hopes
when confronted with economic reality. Let me give
you some examples.
In the mid-1960s, the Federal Government greatly
expanded both its domestic outlays, primarily for the
Great Society Programs, and its foreign involvement,
mainly in the form of defense expenditures for the
Vietuam conffict. After several years and numerous
glowing reports on both projects, it appears to me
that the main effect on the domestic economy of the
expenditure of many billions of dollars has been
severe inflationary pressures. The attempt to maintain
both a “guns and butter” economy has satisfied few
and disappointed many.
Just a few years ago, cleaning up the environment
became a major objective of public policy, with little
thought as to the effects of single-minded pursuit of
such an admirable goal on our energy reserves. Now
that we have found that our energy resources are
more limited than we thought, environmental con-
cerns are battling crash energy programs for news-
paper headlines, Thus, it is my contention that the
public has discovered the hard choices to be made
only after having been allowed to believe the en-
vironmental objective could be attained with minor
costs over a relatively short span of time.
Some time ago, the public was told that the adop-
tion of wage and price controls was a temporary
expedient to relieve inflationary pressures in a less
than fully employed economy. The controls were to
be removed before shortages and economic uncer-
tainty, two by-products of price controls in a high em-
ployment economy, would appear. The “temporary”
controls arc now into their fourth phase. In the cur-
rent high-employment economy, shortages. ~~ndeco-
nomic uncertainty have emerged along with the
inflationary pressures that the controls were adopted
to alleviate.
There are many other cases in which the well-mean-
ing efforts of policymakers to achieve objectives in
one area have caused undesirable side effects in
another. State usury laws, intended to prohibit the
financial exploitation of small borrowers, have de-
prived such borrowers of virtually any access to credit
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in tight money periods. Minimum wage laws were
adopted to insure a minimum level of income to
everyone. However, many studies indicate that the
main effect has been higher wages for workers already
holding comfortable jobs and unemployment for many
of the low-income workers the law svas supposed to
benefit. Government inducements to foreigners to buy
our products, and thereby improve our balance-of-
payments position, were recently reversed in order to
stem complaints about foreigners buying up our
scarce goods.
Attempts by the monetary authorities to moderate
the tendency of interest rates to rise in the face of
strong credit demand have resulted in sharp increases
in the money stock and, subsequently, intensified in-
flationary pressures and even higher interest rates.
The extended freeze on beef prices was, of course,
not designed to dry up beef supplies or stimulate
cattle rustling, but that was its effect. The current
restrictions on domestic fertilizer prices at levels con-
siderably below world market prices, if not relieved,
could result in the marketing by U.S. farmers of
smaller crops in the near future than would otherwise
have been the case, despite the release of snore land
for crop production.
The list of well-intentioned efforts in pursuit of
worthy social and econonlic objectives has become
very long. The factthat many of our current problems
are directly attributable to such efforts has not dis-
couraged the majority of policymakers from trying.
Anyone with a knowledge of a few economic princi-
ples relating to basic supply and demand forces could
have predicted the adverse side effects which fol-
lowed many of the earlier policy actions.
Unfortunately, predicting the policy actions them-
selves is much more difficult. The increased size of
government, and stepped-up governmental interven-
tion in market forces,has made it more necessary than
ever before to recognize the influence of government
actions on economic projections. What will happen in
the remainder of 1973 has been largely determined
by earlier policy actions, but much of economic de-
velopments in 1974 and beyond depend on policy
actions yet to occur.
When Will Inflation Ln.d
Recent poils have shown that the issue which
Americans are most concerned about today is infla-
tion. The fact that the current inflation has persisted
longer than any in the post—\Vorlcl War II period may
partially explain the current malaise. The public is
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quite cognizant that rising prices are eroding their
incomes and their savings, while depreciating the value
of the dollar internationally. It is not surprising that
they are worried about what inflation will do to their
futures. It is an issue that directly strikes every citizen,
unlike war, unemployment, or even Watergate.
It is rather disconcerting to learn from some public
opinion polls that the average citizen has little or no
idea of the cause (and by implication — the cure) of
inflation. Large corporations, unions, or some sinister
“middlemen” are typically blamed, Rarely are fiscal
or monetary actions thought to be the basic cause of
inflation.
The common sense answer to the inflation question,
which one hears surprisingly few times outside eco-
nomic circles, is “too much money chasing too few
goods.” The volume of goods and services produced
over a long period depends mostly on the size of the
population that is of working force age, their degree
of education, the extent of technological development,
and the quantity and quality of raw resources and
capital. The quantity of money produced which
chases the goods is determined primarily by the
monetary authorities, and this quantity could be
closely controlled,
Thus, technically, it is not a difficult matter to
eliminate inflation by reducing the rate of growth in
the volume of money that is chasing the goods and
services. Unfortunately, historical evidence indicates
that the initial consequence of a marked and sustained
reduction in the rate of growth of the money supply
has been a temporary slowing in the rate of growth of
real output and a rise in the unemployment rate. A
lessening of price pressures normally has not occurred
for an extended period after adoption of the restrictive
policy. This is because the public, after repeated bouts
with inflation, simply has not believed that policy-
makers would stick with the restrictive action long
enough to make it work.
Public opinion and attitudes are important not only
with regard to determining the length of time it takes
to get inflation under control, but they also influence
the tools employed in the battle. Even after price
rises had begun to slow in 1970 and 1971 as a result
of the restrictive stabilization policies undertaken in
1969, progress was not fast enough to satisfy the pub-
lic nor their elected representatives. Polls taken in
mid-1971 indicated that many people thought direct
controls should be used to slow the inflationary spiral.
Controls appeared to be a costless way of curbing
price rises, by getting at the “sinister” middleman,
with no ill effects to befall law-abiding citizens and
firms. Controls had the appearance of working for
awhile when there was little excess demnand in the
country. Once the economy approached full capacity
utilization, as it did over the past year, it became
clear that controls not only were unable to stop infla-
tion, but could cause serious shortages, black mnarkets,
and confusion.
Now, after controls have been tried, and despite
the problems of floods, bad weather, and poor Russian
and Chinese harvests, the basic, underlying cause of
inflation remains — too much money chasing too few
goods. In fact this has been the problem svorld-wide,
as money supplies throughout the world have pushed
up domestic prices.
Money supply growth in England, Japan, Germnany,
France, and Canada, to name a few countries, has
virtually exploded during the past two or three years.
In the United States, money supply growth moved up
from about a 2 or 3 percent rate in the 1950s and
early 1960s, to a 6 percent average rate over the past
five years. The result has been inflation, high interest
rates, and dollar devaluation.
The cure for inflation has not changed, despite the
freezing, semi-freezing and unfreezing of prices. The
reversal of stimulative monetary and fiscal actions is a
prerequisite to the reduction of inflationary pressures.
Because of the lag of price changes behind changes
in the rate of growth of the money stock, it probably
would be not only months, but several years before
the adoption of moderate policy actions would have
any lasting, observable effect on the inflation rate. A
severely restrictive policy could accomplish the job
faster, but the cost in terms of lower employment and
output would be more than most of us are prepared
to pay.
And I hasten to add that the use of pervasive wage-
price controls in the current high employment econ-
omy would not serve to speed up the end of inflation.
At best, controls have only some minor, distorting
effect on the timing of individual price changes, but
no lasting effect on the general inflation rate. Ex-
perience both here and abroad has shosvn that adop-
tion of a price freeze under the current circumstances
only delays the rise in prices. You can’t stop inflation
by passing a law against it any more than you can
stop unemployment by passing a law against that.
Since it is my view that there is no easy, costless
way to end inflation through controls, it appears to
me that moderate stabilization actions which avoid
the stop-go excesses of the past would be appropriate.
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Even this course of action could not be undertaken
now without some cost in terms of a transitional slow-
ing in the rate of growth of output and probably a
temporary rise in the unemployment rate.
Will There Be a Recession?
At present, there is no indication that a full-fledged
recession is unavoidable. Real GNP did slow to a 2.4
percent rate of increase in the second quarter of 1973,
from an 8 percent increase in the preceding year.
However, third quarter data are expected to show
a rise in real product closer to its long-run potential
rate of about 4 percent annually.
Despite a slight rise in the unemployment rate from
4.7 percent in July to 4.8 percent in August and Sep-
tember, there remains strong pressure on the produc-
tive capacity of the economy. The Federal Reserve’s
index of capacity utilization of major materials, the
volume of help wanted ads, order backlogs, amid time
continued high level of retail sales all suggest sub-
stantial strength in the economy.
Such strength should carry on for somne time. There
are widespread reports of expansion in output being
limited in many industries next year by shortages of
raw materials and skilled labor. Thus, I believe that
a slowdown of output growth the balance of 1973
and early 1974 will be as much a reflection of supply
constraints as a reduction in the growth of total
demand.
The course of monetary expansion over the last
half of 1973 and early 1974 could exercise such re-
straint on growth of total demand that a recession
would be produced. For example, suppose there was
a desire to curb inflation quickly by holding the
money stock unchanged from mid-1973 until next
summer. Our studies indicate that a recession would
almost certainly occur next year if such a sharp and
prolonged reduction in the rate of money growth
should occur.
I believe there is a path available for mnaking somne
progress toward the reduction in the average rate of
inflation while avoiding a recession next year. Such a
path would involve a modest deceleration in the rate
of increase in the narrowly defined money stock for
the last half of 1973, followed by moderate growth in
the first half of next year. Our studies suggest that
such a course of persistent, moderate restraint on the
rate of monetary expansion would foster less infla-
tionary pressure in 1974 than we have had this year,
while not being so restrictive as to plunge us into a
sharp economic slowdown. If inflation is to be reduced
eventually to a low rate, moderate money growth
will have to be maintained for several years.
Will There Be a Credit Crunch?
That is, will the flow of credit be sharply altered
from its normal channels as in 1966 and in late 1969
and early 1970? In those years, the source of funds to
financial institutions, such as savings and loan associa-
tions and mutual savings banks, was severely cur-
tailed, as was the availability of mortgage money to
home buyers. Market interest rates rose sharply be-
cause of a strong demand for credit in the face of a
restricted growth in the supply. Legal ceilings on the
interest rates payable by the savings institutions
handicapped them in competing with market instru-
ments for the savings of wealthy individuals and busi-
nesses. The “small” saver was unable to obtainm the
high yields available on market debt instruments.
Consequently, the burden of monetary restraint was
borne most heavily by financial intermediaries, the
housing sector, and the small saver.
\Vhether another credit crunch will occur depends
first on movememits of market interest rates, and sec-
ond, on the extent to which legal interest rate ceilings
cause distortions in channels through which credit
normally flows. The demand for credit, which is one
of the factors influencing interest rates, should remain
strong for some time. The quantity of credit de-
manded by both consumers and businesses has shown
little sign of subsiding recently despite the current
high level of interest rates. Surveys indicate business-
men intended to continue to expand plant and equip-
ment capacity through 1974. Although the cash posi-
tion of many firms remains strong, it is expected that
a sizeable volume of the funds necessary for expansion
must be obtained in the credit markets.
On the other hand, credit demands of state and
local governments have moderated with the advent
of Federal revenue sharing. State and local govern-
ments were adversely affected during the past crunch
periods because of the legal ceilings on the rates they
could offer on bond issues, hut revenue sharing has
lessened state and local governmnent vulnerability to
any future crnnch.
The Federal Government’s budget, which had been
in deficit (expenditures exceeding tax receipts) for
thirteen consecutive quarters (on a national income
accounts basis), was finally in balance in the second
quarter of 1973. Because of the strong pace of eco-
nomic activity, which generated considerable tax reve-
nues, and the exercise of fiscal restraint on expendi-
Page 17FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 1973
tures, the Federal Government’s demands for funds
have moderated significantly. If the growth of aggre-
gate demand in the economy slows, causing growth
of tax revenues to slow, some step-up in Federal Gov-
ernment credit demands can be expected; however, I
foresee no great pressures from Government deficits
in the near future.
In short, growth of credit demands throughout the
economy should continue strong, but at a moderated
pace. Some further growth in demand for credit can
be met without sharply higher intermediate and long-
term interest rates. The movement of short-tenn mar-
ket interest rates will depend on a great many factors
including monetary actions.
Regardless of the monetary policy adopted, the
hkelihood of an availability crunch at recent levels of
interest rates is less now than in the 1966 and 1969-70
periods. Legal ceilings on interest rates paid by a
number of savings institutions have been either elimi-
nated or greatly relaxed in many cases. Moreover,
expanding Federal or semi-Federal agencies such as
FNMA and GNMA can be expected to supply more
funds to the housing sector than in the earlier tight
credit situations. Thus, the effects of mnonetary
restraint, whenever applied, should be more evenly
diffused throughout the economy.
What is the Outlook for the International
Monetary Situation?
In the past, painless solutions in this area have also
been sought. So far they have escaped us. With the
fixed international value of the dollar from 1944 to
1971 it was quite generally believed that the best of
all possible worlds had been created. The risks of ex-
change rate movemnents were virtually eliminated, the
dollar became the international currency and ex-
cesses of exports and imports were to be prevented
through voluntary domestic adjtmstments or through
internationally agreeable changes in the exchange
rate.
Early in the post-war period, the United States sup-
plied dollars to the world through the Marshall Plan
and various grant arrangements, thus transferring re-
sources to the war-ravaged parts of the world. This
provided us with an export balance and pacified those
who were worried about the balance of payments.
Later, it provided dollars for international transac-
tions, thus transferring resources back to the United
States and providing export surplnses for other indus-
trial nations.
But as other nations built up their industrial poten-
tial and began to compete and assert their sovereignty,
economic and political realities began to emerge. The
maintenance of the fixed dollar exchange rate, in the
face of improving foreign productivity and sharply
accelerating U.S. inflation, generated an overvalued
dollar.
The result was an excess of U.S. imports and a
deficit in the liquidity account with a hundred billion
dollar accumulation of liquid assets by foreigners.
There was also a realization that this accumulation of
dollars meant a transfer of real resources from for-
eigners to the United States. Finally, there was the
realization that the fixed international value of the
dollar could no longer be maintained.
The floating exchange rate system, which emerged
from the so-called crisis of 1971, seems to be working
reasonably well, even though it is subject to frequent
interference from governmental agencies. The U.S.
trade deficit has been virtually eliminated, global trade
is again growing at pre-float rates, surplus countries
can deal better with inflation, and all countries can
pursue independent domnestic economic policies.
But apparently everyone is not satisfied with this
arrangement. The transition has not been without
costs; our imports have become more expensive, coun-
tries who desire a permanent export balance cannot
have it, ammd those who have a love affair with gold
see it relegated simply to the status of any other
commodity.
There are those who still believe that some govern-
mental or international action can produce an arrange-
ment quite similar to that which prevailed prior to
mid-1971, and that such an arrangement would im-
prove on the present situation. The recent meetings in
Nairobi are a case in point. The participants of these
meetings were groping for a more rigid exchange rate
mechanism, while realizing that the old fixed rate
system is unworkable. The basic argument that
emerges is — how fixed should the rate be? The United
States is arguing for an arrangement ‘whereby the
fixed rate must change when a country accumulates
a certain amount of international reserves. Some other
countries argue that a change should not take place
automatically, but only after consultation and
agreement.
The U.S. position is quite simnilar to the floating rate
mechanism, and the other position is almost identical
to the old fixed rate arrangement. Again, some people
have not learned the lessons of the past and, again,
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think that they can have all the benefits without hav-
ing to pay the price.
If some fixity of exchange rates is at all desirable,
then I would support the reported position of the U.S.
Treasury. It is mny firm belief that an international
payments mechanism svith a non-automnatic change in
the exchange rate would break down and bring about
crises for which we would all have to pay.
Summary Ohservations
The unhappiness of many people today would he
greatly ameliorated if they thought inflation would be
ended tomorrow. It simnply cannot be done, given the
stimulative fiscal and monetary actions of the past
few years. Attempts to curb inflation quickly through
controls have resulted in shortages, a reduction in
economic freedom, and added uncertainty to every-
one’s life. Efforts by monetary and fiscal authorities
to quickly end inflation would likely precipitate a
credit crnnch and a severe recession.
Adoption now of moderate stabilization actions
would eventually reduce inflationary pressures with-
out a credit crunch or recession, but it would take
considerable time, patience, and a minimum of legal
interference iii our mnarket economy. Unfortunately,
our past record on patience and avoiding the excesses
of either stimulus or restraint is not one which inspires
confidence.
Further, we seem to be developing a growing in-
fatuation with the exercise of power to impede the
operation of free mnarkets by constantly surfacing new
ideas and programs for controls which usually have
ended imp aecomnplishing exactly the opposite of what
they were proposed to do. I am fully aware that there
must be some minimum rules and regulations in a
market-oriented democratic society, but why camit we
keep our hands off the functioning of the markets and
permit them to continue their proven, traditional role
in the most efficient and equitable distribution of the
product of our labors.
F ft
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